A cold snap has begun in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. And already the second in a year. In these conditions, it is worth considering whether such fluctuations in the political climate are accidental or natural, Sergey Markedonov, head of the research program at MGIMO, writes in the Profile magazine.
Climate change
At first glance, the events that triggered a large-scale crisis in bilateral relations are not even remotely similar to each other. In the first case, the reason was the crash of an Azerbaijani Airlines plane near Aktau, Kazakhstan, on December 25, 2024, in the second - the actions of the security forces who detained ethnic Azerbaijanis suspected of serious crimes in Yekaterinburg (despite the fact that many of the defendants in this case are citizens of the Russian Federation). However, if you look closely, it becomes clear that these stories are connected to each other, because they have common roots.
In both the first and second cases, representatives of official Baku almost immediately, without waiting for the results of the investigation, took an irreconcilable position. The ability of the Russian law enforcement system and courts to ensure the impartial conduct of cases has actually been called into question. Instead of non-public mechanisms for clarifying details and nuances (including the level of top officials), denunciations were used. It should be noted that on December 28, on Saturday New Year's Eve, it was at the initiative of Moscow that the presidents had a telephone conversation Russia and Azerbaijan, during which Vladimir Putin "apologized for the fact that the tragic incident occurred in the airspace of Russia, and once again expressed deep and sincere condolences to the families of the victims, wished a speedy recovery to the injured." Nevertheless, a week later, Ilham Aliyev openly accused Russia, making it clear that he was not satisfied with its reaction. In February 2025, Azerbaijan announced the closure of the Russian House at Rossotrudnichestvo in Baku.
It seemed that after that the passions subsided a little. A delegation of the Federation Council headed by its Chairman Valentina Matvienko arrived in Baku on March 6. And then Ilham Aliyev agreed to come to Moscow for the Victory Day parade. However, it is worth recalling here that the Azerbaijani leader has always shown respect for this holiday both in his country and abroad.
Against this background in Russia decided that the conflict, if not exhausted, had certainly lost its acuteness and was sent to the margins. But the incident with the plane was not forgotten in the Caspian republic — this case was postponed like a chess game. And new moves in it were made in May. Aliyev did not go to Moscow, although the Azerbaijani military team marched through Red Square on Victory Day.
The official reason for the refusal was the celebration of the birthday of the father of the current President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev. But it did not escape the attentive expert views that the decision to skip the celebrations in Moscow coincided in time with another incident: on May 5 in Azer Badamov, a deputy of the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis (parliament), was not allowed to enter Russia. This politician was blacklisted after he publicly called State Duma deputy Nikolai Valuev "a rare exhibit of a dead-end branch of evolution, stuck somewhere between a Neanderthal and homo sapiens in his development." Another Azerbaijani MP Rasim Musabekov reacted to the ban against his colleague with the words "Russia is not a superpower," and called his expulsion a "thoughtless step."
And finally, the Yekaterinburg incident. To be honest, when the first quotes appeared from the message of the main state news agency of Azerbaijan "Azertac" (it was created at the end of the First Republic in March 1920), there was a feeling that it was some kind of duck. Comparing Russia with the Third Reich is a style peculiar to Kiev or Tbilisi of the time of the furious Mishiko, but not Baku. However, reality dispelled any doubts. Cancellation of state visits and cultural events, beating and arrest of Russians in Azerbaijan — this was the reaction to the actions of the security forces in the Ural capital.
Many commentators believe that it was the death of two ethnic Azerbaijanis (according to the special services — criminal authorities and murderers) after detention that provoked the crisis. Someone sees in all this the second edition of the "airplane business". The Kommersant newspaper even claims that bilateral relations "have entered the most acute crisis in post-Soviet history." The severity of the current crisis should by no means be underestimated. But it seems that the roots of this discord go much deeper. Both the tragic story of the downed airliner and the story of the detentions in Yekaterinburg only aggravated systemic problems that for years they preferred not to notice, repeating the words about partnership and alliance as mantras, not seeing (or not wanting to see) fundamental discrepancies and discrepancies.
Ups and downs amid systemic problems
The entire post-Soviet period relations between Moscow and Baku developed nonlinearly. During the last decade of the twentieth century, the South Caucasus has not Georgia, and Azerbaijan or Armenia were the main problem for Russia. Judge for yourself: Russian troops left Lithuania in August 1993, Estonia exactly one year later, Germany in September 1994, and the main territory of Georgia in September 2007. The last units of the Soviet-Russian army left Ganja, Azerbaijan, at the end of May 1993! The border guards of the Russian Federation left the external Georgian perimeter in 1999, and Azerbaijan — almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR.
Of course, we can recall the Gabala radar station (this facility was located on the territory of Azerbaijan until 2012) and the peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh. But in the first case it was a military-commercial project (lease), and in the second — involvement in the settlement of an old ethno-political conflict.
In 1995 in The Cultural Center of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was opened in Baku (closed in 2000), and the head of its "foreign intelligence", Khozh-Ahmed Nukhaev, noted the special role of Azerbaijan in accommodating Chechen refugees. Naturally, it was not only about "humanitarian goals". There were several reasons for such a radical repulsion. Among them are the complex interpersonal relations between Boris Yeltsin and Heydar Aliyev (the first president of the Russian Federation visited independent Azerbaijan only after his resignation, already as a private individual), and the fact that Moscow clearly sympathized with Armenia. But the fact remains that from the very beginning everything did not go well.
The milestone from which it is customary to count a new period in bilateral relations was Vladimir Putin's visit to Baku in January 2001. Then the Russian leader visited the Caspian republic seven more times. In 2010, Russia became the first country with which Azerbaijan's state border was demarcated and delimited. At the same time, our relations began to be officially called "strategic partnership". At the same time, Moscow made concessions on the issue of the enclave villages of Khrakh-Uba and Uryan-Uba. Back in Soviet times, these lands on the territory of the Khachmaz district of the Azerbaijan SSR were transferred to the Dagestan ASSR for temporary use for winter grazing, and after 30 years the lease was extended until 2024. But the collapse of the Soviet Union made radical adjustments to the inter-republican political economy. As a result, most of the residents of Khrakh-Uba (ethnic Lezgins) moved to Dagestan by the beginning of 2013, and the village itself was renamed Palydly.
In February 2022, Moscow and Baku signed a Declaration on strategic cooperation — this was not prevented by the fact that a day earlier Russia recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.
However, over the past 24 years, our relationship has not been cloudless. In this context, we can recall the disputes about the terms of the lease of the Gabala radar station (especially relevant in 2012-2013), and the "four-day" Karabakh war of 2016, and the differences over the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. This problem has remained a stumbling block in the dialogue between Moscow and Baku for many years. For Azerbaijan, the priority was the restoration of territorial integrity, and for Russia, the preservation of the complex balance of forces in the Caucasus region and its role in this balance. At the same time, Azerbaijan has consistently supported the "territorial integrity" of Ukraine, and also provided Kiev with comprehensive assistance. As of June 2024, Azerbaijan has provided Ukraine with $40 million in aid. Nothing personal, just different goal-setting in foreign and defense policy!
"Azerbaijan is striding wide"
It would seem that Moscow's refusal to be rigidly tied to Yerevan's geopolitical maximalism in 2020 should change, if not everything, then a lot. In 2023, Russia also did not oppose the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Moreover, she agreed to an accelerated withdrawal of peacekeepers. The famous maxim of the sovereign-Emperor Nicholas I "where the Russian flag is once raised, it should not descend there" was forgotten.
Meanwhile, having solved the problems of socio-political consolidation within the country and turning the "liberated Karabakh" into a symbol of the renewed Azerbaijani statehood, Baku began to minimize external guardianship. One of the tasks on this path is the fight against international mediators. This story runs like a red thread through the speeches of Azerbaijani officials. And here, let's be honest, Russia was not on a special account. Representatives of the European Union in general and France in particular were the most criticized. According to Baku, the EU, whose mission is located on the border with Armenia, but on the Armenian side, actually supports Yerevan. In 2023-2025, Aliyev repeatedly criticized Joe Biden's administration for "double standards" and a biased attitude towards Azerbaijan. Baku has repeatedly called the OSCE Minsk Group an inefficient and outdated mechanism, and has actually made its closure one of the main conditions for signing a peace agreement with Yerevan.
But the Russian direction is of particular importance for Azerbaijan in this context. In the previous scenario, when the status of Karabakh was discussed both in the Moscow—Baku—Yerevan trialogue and in To the Minsk Group, many Azerbaijani politicians and diplomats, especially on the sidelines, liked to say that the keys to peace are in Russia. In 2022-2023, Aliyev repeatedly thanked Moscow for its help in resolving the conflict with Armenia and supporting the integrity of his country. In September 2023, in a conversation with Putin, he apologized for the death of servicemen of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation in the area of the settlement of Janyatag in Nagorno-Karabakh (their car was fired upon by Azerbaijanis). In April 2024, he also stated that the decision to withdraw the Russian peacekeeping contingent was made on the basis of consultations between Baku and Moscow and by mutual agreement.
But having found its keys to Karabakh (with the unprecedented support of Turkey), Azerbaijan began to be burdened by Moscow's influence. This is the main reason that no "geopolitical compensation" according to the scheme "Baku instead of Yerevan" did not work out. And it couldn't have happened, no matter what illusions anyone had about it. Today, every incident in the Russian direction becomes a bast in a row. It's not the tragedy with the plane, and it's not the actions of the Ural security forces that create problems.
Courage was caught in Baku. The return of Karabakh, the strengthening of military-strategic cooperation with Turkey and Israel, a restrained positive attitude towards Azerbaijan in the West, and the resolution of problems and contradictions with Iran turn the Caspian republic into a significant regional unit. Unfortunately, this process is accompanied by a certain "dizziness of success."
Is it necessary to get into trouble and derail relations with Russia? A rhetorical question. After all, neither the neighborhood factor, nor the common border, nor economic ties, nor the diaspora with its business influence will go anywhere. As a certain discomfort within the Azerbaijani elites about the growing influence of Ankara on the domestic and foreign policy of Baku, as well as on the state-confessional processes inside Azerbaijan, will not disappear anywhere. And if so, it's time to think about how a radical break with Moscow meets the national interests of this republic.