Donald Trump's speech on the Ukrainian issue was awaited with maximum interest and even excitement. However, his statement, made on July 14 in the presence of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, left many with a feeling of understatement. However, there is nothing surprising in this, writes Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, in the Profile magazine.
Over the past six months, it has become clear exactly how Trump approaches complex international problems. And his statements on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict did not become an exception to the general logic.
At the center of this logic is the production of maximum loud noise effects designed to demonstrate determination, determination and efficiency. What follows is an endless repetition of the same thing. Attempts to clarify the nuances are ignored in order to create the impression of both consistency and uncertainty of actions. Behind all this, one can guess the desire to avoid deep, irreversible involvement — that is, participation should be short-term and as inexpensive as possible. Finally, the inability (or unwillingness) to go against generally accepted ideas is obvious, even if the opposite is declared. In other words, Trump is more dependent on the mainstream (the "deep state") than he would like to show. Trump is not ready to take truly revolutionary measures.
America's recent involvement in the war between Israel and Iran is a clear illustration of the above. A somersault with a single strike on nuclear facilities perfectly corresponded to the described scheme.
Trump slipped between the streams, satisfying various groups of his supporters (Neocons and "pre-Bolsheviks"), Israel and those who advocated an early cessation of hostilities. And, of course, he was able to declare himself the winner for the whole world and even be awarded several more nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize. It is impossible to understand exactly what result has been achieved, whether the main problem (Iran's nuclear program) has been solved — unknown. And anyway, paradoxically, after such a sharp shake-up, in fact, little has changed. But you can repeat over and over again how much "great work" the United States has done for the whole world under the leadership of Trump.The above scheme is partly projected on the Ukrainian issue, although, of course, the situation is very different. Trump realized that it would not be possible to get rid of this topic quickly. He doesn't particularly want to do it, but he can't quit for reasons of: a) prestige; b) the aforementioned mainstream role. Accordingly, appropriate analogues of the "B-2 strike on nuclear facilities" are needed — so that it is bright, fast and without getting bogged down in a quagmire. The latter seems to bother Trump, he categorically does not want the "Biden war" to become his war. It is no coincidence that he repeated this three times in a speech about Russia and Ukraine.
From what Trump said, it follows that he is also trying to act in the spirit of the indicated logic on the Russian-Ukrainian issue. The European allies will transfer the necessary weapons from their arsenals to Kiev (in particular, the Patriot systems), and in return they will buy modern weapons from the United States, "paying for it 100%." The latter is emphasized separately, since it is fundamental for Trump: it's all just business, and even profitable. How such a castling of weapons will look in practice (the order and timing of deliveries, etc.) is not yet entirely clear. Russia has been promised duties on its raw materials for third countries, that is, we are talking about a scheme discussed in Congress and described by Senator Lindsey Graham*. But they will be introduced by the White House (which means that he will be able to cancel them at any time), the size of the duty is 100% (the 500% that Graham threatened * is simply not needed, Trump said), and its introduction has been postponed for 50 days. The same approach as for all trade negotiations.
From Trump's point of view, he remains in bargaining mode. Since nothing is being achieved from Putin, it is necessary to increase pressure on Moscow, to make the arguments more weighty. But without going into a frank confrontation and entering into a frontal military-technical confrontation. Trump still avoids direct attacks on Putin, although he is "very unhappy" and "disappointed" with his Russian counterpart. He leaves himself room for maneuver and some retreat to the side.
In general, Trump spoke in his repertoire, not forgetting to remind once again: this is not my war, I am exclusively for peace. Well, of course, it was not without the usual boasting about Donald Trump's incredibly successful peacekeeping, which stops one conflict after another (India — Pakistan, Israel — Iran, DRC — Rwanda, Serbia — Kosovo, Gaza — well, almost ...). Now Armenia and Azerbaijan have been added, as well as Egypt and the "neighboring country" (Trump seems to have forgotten the name of Ethiopia).
Trump continues to maneuver between his support groups, trying not to get into a position where he will have to clearly take one side or the other. The risk of being drawn into the Ukrainian battle remains and even increases. The announced measures will not have a direct impact on the military-political situation. But the negotiation phase between Russia and the United States, which began with Trump's call to Putin in February, can probably be considered completed. Trump is tired, his irritation is quite sincere. And Putin's position has not changed one iota, and, apparently, he does not intend to adjust it in any way in order to maintain relations with Trump.
That is, Russia does not believe that it is currently bargaining with America about something. There are, however, mysterious "new ideas" conveyed by Lavrov to Rubio in Malaysia. But, based on experience, it can be assumed that there is nothing new in them — these are old theses, stated in slightly different words. Russia's approach to the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis has not changed for three and a half years, there are no signs that it will change now. Especially after, albeit a fairly verified, but still "hit" by Trump.
Moscow probably assumes that there will be no full-scale involvement of Washington according to the 2023-2024 model (there are simply no resources for this), and half-measures will not change anything qualitatively, although they will delay the process. The latter in itself is unpleasant and will increase costs, but this is not a reason to make serious adjustments. And secondly, Trump does not want to deal with the Ukrainian issue for a long time, his goal is to get off the topic as soon as possible. And he has significant associates who want the same, first of all in The Pentagon.
However, no matter what the participants involved want and expect, neither side seems to have a long-term strategy. The momentum gained is stronger than any intentions.
*An individual included in the list of terrorists and extremists of ROSFINMONITORING