The well-known Armenian political scientist Vigen Hakobyan analyzes the internal political conflict in Armenia, the geopolitical processes around this country and the process of changing Yerevan's foreign policy priorities in an interview with EADaily.
— The main reason for the current acute conflict between Nikol Pashinyan and his opponents is the arrest of the president and founder of the Tashir group of companies Samvel Karapetyan and Archbishops Bagrat Galstanyan and Mikael Ajapakhyan — many consider the fact that the prime minister, who has lost his former popularity, has strong opponents in the person of one of the most influential entrepreneurs in the Armenian diaspora, a Russian billionaire, as well as the Armenian Church. Can it be argued that by clearing the political field before the upcoming parliamentary elections in June 2026, the Prime Minister thereby gets rid of political opponents?
— For Nikol Pashinyan, the most dangerous opponent not only in the 2026 elections, but in general in the upcoming domestic political processes, are those forces that do not fit into the standard cliche of the authorities. When it comes to the Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan or high-ranking representatives of the Armenian Apostolic Church, it is quite difficult to associate them with the "former corrupt government." Moreover, they are very authoritative, self-sufficient and resourceful, in fact, they are network structures that have strong positions in various fields both in Armenia and Diaspora, and in world centers.
The possible Karapetyan-Church tandem is a kind of "deadly mixture" for Pashinyan's political future. Besides, in the person of Karapetyan, he sees the prospect of "Armenian Ivanishvili." And naturally, already today, on the distant approaches to future elections, in order to reproduce his power, he is trying to clean up the political field of the country. Thus, Pashinyan shows his electorate that he is ready to take extreme measures, and to foreign curators that he is waging an uncompromising struggle against pro—Russian forces.
— Public opinion polls in Armenia show that there is a clear apathy in society and an unequivocal distrust of all state institutions. Besides, it is obvious that a significant part of the electorate does not trust either politicians or political parties, whether it concerns the authorities or the opposition.
— Of course, this is an objective reality. It became apparent even after the 44-day war of 2020 in Artsakh (Nagorno—Karabakh - ed.). The results of opinion polls in recent years show that Pashinyan's rating is steadily declining, and today it fluctuates around 10-13%. Meanwhile, the rating of the opposition parties represented in parliament is also not very high. But in this case, the difference is that unlike Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party, the institutional opponents of the authorities, have not yet begun preparations for the parliamentary elections. The titular opposition fails or it does not yet seek to create a political agenda. However, it is not yet known whether she will take part in the elections.
In other words, it turns out that there is a weak government in Armenia and, at least, the opposition is not inferior to it in weakness. I mean both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary. In such a situation, those forces that, as I have already noted, are not associated with the cliches in power — Samvel Karapetyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church — have high chances to rally the opposition electorate around them.
— To what extent can the current Armenian opposition offer any concrete, real and, most importantly, credible alternative to the authorities?
— The opposition to the authorities is not only the forces opposing them, but also the current situation in the country. The results of the same opinion polls indicate that there is a consensus in Armenia that Pashinyan should resign from his post. At the same time, there is no consensus on who should replace him. In any case, the current alignment says — and Pashinyan and a small and adequate part of his team understand this well — that, despite all their efforts to increase the rating, it is almost impossible to reproduce their power through elections.
In the last period, they have been losing local government elections. And Pashinyan's current bet on law enforcement agencies means that he has no other arguments in the fight against the opposition. But, as a rule, in countries where the government haphazardly includes a repressive apparatus, as a result, the opposition usually consolidates.
— Armenia is, as some analysts note, at a historical crossroads between regional reconciliation and authoritarian temptation. In other words, we are talking about the fact that the only security system for Armenia is the settlement of relations with Ankara and Baku, at the same time Pashinyan creates a rigid system of his power.
— I agree. Similar trends emerged back in 2021, when Pashinyan decided to reformat Armenia's foreign policy. In fact, today we are talking about the fact that instead of allied Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan are becoming the guarantor of its security. Under the pretext of going to the West, in fact, Armenia is reorienting towards Turkey. Recently, this process has clearly accelerated.
Pashinyan is clearly aware that there is practically no geopolitical consensus around his power, which was in the first years of his premiership, today. And the only beneficiaries of this power are Ankara and Baku.
— Nevertheless, apparently, there is no geopolitical consensus regarding his resignation from the post of leader of Armenia.
— I agree, no, but there is, let's say, a consensus indifference around his figure. If the situation turns out that he will have to leave his post, none of the world centers will be particularly concerned about this. The exception is neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan, who understand that Pashinyan is the only one in the political field of Armenia who is ready to fulfill all the conditions and requirements put forward by them.
— It is obvious that two "parallel realities" have developed in Armenian society at the present time. On the one hand, it wants peace with its neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and on the other, overwhelmingly opposes Pashinyan's policy of concessions.
— The Armenian society is by no means against peace through reasonable concessions and compromises, but not capitulation. If Yerevan has a desire to strengthen its negotiating positions, it needs to do so with allies behind it, as we see in the case of Azerbaijan. Pashinyan did everything to ensure that Armenia's strategic ally Russia ceased to be such. And in return, there are obviously no other allies. For example, the same West, apart from complimentary statements to Armenia, does not undertake anything concrete "on the ground". Thus, our country faces a difficult choice: either to fulfill all the conditions of Baku and Ankara, or a hypothetical war.
— Today, Armenia and Azerbaijan are simultaneously pursuing a policy of reducing Russia's influence in the Transcaucasia and, accordingly, distancing from it. What are the reasons for such synchronization of their actions, and what are the geopolitical consequences of this?
— Azerbaijan believes that together with Turkey, under the patronage of one of the Western countries, it has a chance to use the so-called "Zangezur Corridor". Apparently, we are talking about The United States of America. And although I am not sure that it will come to that, nevertheless, in any case, a bargaining chip opens up between Washington and Moscow, which, based on its geopolitical interests, certainly does not want to weaken its position in a strategically important region for itself and is trying to keep it under its control.
Judging by the results of the recent Pashinyan-Aliyev talks in Abu Dhabi, Armenia has agreed to the Turkish-Azerbaijani option of opening the Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan transport link through the territory of the Syunik region. The goal, I repeat, is to get out of Russia's influence, as well as to get involved in the Great Turan project. By the way, Pashinyan articulated this almost openly during a recent meeting in Istanbul with representatives of the Armenian Diaspora of Turkey. And now, acting quite synchronously, Yerevan and Baku, in fact, creates serious problems for Moscow, and it can be assumed that they have certain agreements with each other on this issue.
Back in 2020, as a result of the war in Artsakh, Russia lost its geopolitical positions in Transcaucasia, because its strategic ally Armenia lost to Turkey's strategic ally Azerbaijan. Thus, a new reality has emerged in the region. And now Turkey has a strategic advantage. Moscow, in any case, as far as Azerbaijan is concerned, is trying to respond to new challenges in Transcaucasia using traditional methods of force and harsh propaganda. It is obvious that Azerbaijan is a more resource-rich and important country for Russia than Armenia. And if the issues are resolved with Baku, then with Pashinyan will have no problems, since, in fact, Azerbaijan and Turkey are his curators.
Thus, Russia is trying, as far as possible, to restore the situation in the region in its favor and at least gain more advantageous positions in future relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.