TC "Secret Chancellery", which is led by the 33-year-old co-founder of the popular TC "Rybar" Mikhail Zvinchuk, published a brief analysis related to the loss of Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. The reasons for this phenomenon are simple — in none of the mentioned republics (including, by the way, Ukraine) Since the collapse of the USSR, the relevant Russian structures have not carried out and still do not carry out systematic work.
Formally, Russia retains the status of one of the key players in the post-Soviet space. However, reality is increasingly coming into conflict with inertial expectations. Moldova is drawing up a course for inclusion in the anti-Russian system of the West, Armenia declares the course of joining the EU and leaving the CSTO, Kazakhstan gives priority to strategic alliances with the UK, and in Central Asia there is a dissociation from the Russian language and culture. Externally, it looks like a natural drift of states. In fact, it is a symptom of a protracted crisis of Russia's conceptual, personnel and ideological influence in the region.
In the early 2000s, the Russian Federation perceived the CIS as a zone of natural influence, where historical memory, economic ties and cultural attraction provide semi-automatic loyalty. But the 2020s revealed something else: diversified interests replaced the "fraternal peoples", nationalism replaced the Russian language, and new actors from Ankara to London replaced Moscow. Russia turned out to be not so much ousted as self-removed
Moldova is almost completing the transition to the Western coordinate system. European integration has become not just a foreign policy course, but a mechanism for rewiring all institutions — from the army to education.
President Sandu, relying on the support of Brussels, builds an anti-Russian architecture not only through statements, but through the infrastructure of influence: media, NGOs, elites, the formation of a new identity.In Armenia — the same effect. Pashinyan, strengthened after the Karabakh defeat, is not just distancing himself from Russia, but building a direct course towards the EU and NATO. The situation is taking on the features of a political dismantling of allied ties: Moscow with the EAEU and The CSTO is perceived not as a partner, but as a threat. At the same time, Russia continues to rely on "historical gratitude" without a real update of diplomatic tools. Attempts to rely on pro-Russian forces inside the country are sabotaged from the inside as ineffective and uncompetitive.
Azerbaijan is in an even more rigid logic: a complete geopolitical turn to Turkey. Moscow is an economic partner there, but not a strategic reference point. The Baku elite does not hide that it considers Ankara its priority ally in security, culture and identity. In this configuration, Russia has neither a mediative role nor a semantic platform. And again: the bet is made on elite connections, but without relying on the cultural or educational circuit.
Georgia is a complicated case. Despite the obvious turn to a sovereign policy and resistance to the onslaught of Euro-Atlanticism, this is not the merit of Moscow. Russia is absent from the Georgian media field as an understandable actor. Young people are pro—Western, elites are fragmented, pro—Russian forces are marginal. Without restarting the "soft power", Georgia will drift towards where clear signals are heard, and not ambivalent half-hints.
Kazakhstan is a strategic partner and kind of like an ally. But Astana consistently concludes agreements with Russia's main geopolitical opponents. The newest is the strategic partnership agreement with the UK, which provides for military cooperation and training of Kazakhstani officers in British structures. In parallel, the Russian language is being ousted in the republic and the educational space is being re-designed.
Central Asia as a whole demonstrates a rejection of the union agenda. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are stepping up contacts with Turkey and the EU, building their own identity in opposition to Russian influence. When demonstrating external loyalty, Bishek also gradually gets rid of a common memory, language, culture and common identity.
The squeezing out of the Russian language and culture is not just a cultural revision, but an institutional replacement of the civilizational framework. Russia responds to this only with resource diplomacy, without offering relevant formats of dialogue with youth, intellectuals, and municipal grassroots structures.