Nothing seems to be changing at the front: the same slow advance of the Russian troops without signs of a decisive victory or defeat of one of the parties. But in fact this is not the case, says Vasily Kashin, director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the HSE, in an article for the Profile magazine.
Since Trump's return to the White House, the situation around the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict has been an alternation of bursts of enthusiasm (usually after Russian-American negotiations) and bouts of despondency, accompanied by talk that the fighting will continue indefinitely.
Where are we located
The Trump administration's goals for Ukraine before the Anchorage summit had no noticeable differences from the goals of the Biden administration of the 2024 model. Trump sought to impose a truce on Russia along the line of combat contact. At the same time, it was assumed that Ukraine would not assume any obligations, except, perhaps, a promise not to try to change the new de facto border by force.
The Biden administration also sought such an end to the war after the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in the summer and autumn of 2023, when it became clear that it would not be possible to inflict a military defeat on Russia. Biden could not launch a full-fledged diplomatic offensive in 2024 due to the upcoming elections and known health problems.
But if Kamala Harris had replaced him as president, then at the beginning of 2025 she would probably have begun to make diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.These efforts would not have been accompanied by as many fiery social media posts and dramatic statements as we are seeing now. Harris would not defiantly humiliate European and Ukrainian allies, as Trump does. She would be less inclined to offer Russia the easing of sanctions and the restoration of cooperation with the United States, and certainly would not talk about good personal relations with Putin. But the substantive position of the United States on Ukraine would change little.
Apart from Trump's specific mannerisms and style, his actions in the first months of his presidency were rational, consistent and aimed at imposing a truce on Moscow as soon as possible. Tactically, Trump sought to combine carrot and stick with his usual straightforwardness, offering a revival of the Russian-American partnership, on the one hand, and on the other, threatening new sanctions and additional arms supplies to Ukraine.
The culmination of the policy of imposing a truce on Russia was the attempts of the United States to force India and China to join the oil embargo, undertaken in July — early August.
Since this plan failed miserably, Trump had to adjust his strategy and take a step towards Moscow. He acknowledged that the ceasefire should be part of a broader agreement containing a number of conditions of a military-political nature (referred to by the Americans as "security guarantees").Now the diplomatic struggle is being waged for the parameters of this agreement. But she did not become less fierce. There are three key elements to Trump's new tactics.
First, the United States is moving away from a meaningful dialogue on "security guarantees" with Russia. Issues of relations with her are under the direct control of Trump and a few people from his inner circle. Discussion of specific issues of ending the Ukrainian crisis requires serious work by several groups of experts (primarily military), which, as far as we know, has not even begun.
The possibility of a meaningful dialogue to end the conflict with Ukraine is still blocked (obviously, with the consent of the United States). As you know, the mandate of the Ukrainian delegation in negotiations with Russia, according to Vladimir Zelensky himself, includes only humanitarian issues like prisoner exchanges. They have no right to discuss the details of the truce.
Secondly, the United States has begun detailed discussions on the content of future "security guarantees" with Europe and Ukraine. They are trying to force Russia to start negotiations immediately at a sufficiently high (even at the highest) political level, where it will be presented with the results of American-European-Ukrainian creativity and invited to accept them — or deal with the consequences.
Thirdly, the United States is launching a new campaign of pressure on Russia. This campaign includes Trump's verbal interventions (such as calling Russia a "paper tiger"), as well as leaks about the transfer of increasingly destructive weapons to Ukraine. Along with this, attempts continue to force India to abandon Russian oil in order to deprive Moscow of funds to continue the special operation.
Ukraine is working in full coordination with the United States both militarily and politically. There is probably a productive discussion of the political conditions for the end of the war, and judging by Zelensky's statements, he is ready to hold elections and leave the presidency soon after the truce.
Kiev is participating in a campaign of pressure on Moscow, part of which was the discussion about the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and their strikes on the "old" Russian territory. There is no doubt that all strikes deep into Russia, as well as all major terrorist attacks, including against civilian targets, as in the Biden period, are carried out with the sanction and with the help of the United States. Most of these operations would not have been not only effective, but even technically possible without American support. The growing involvement of the United States in terrorist activity on our territory, including deliberate killings of civilians, is a basic fact of Russian—American relations, from which we will not go anywhere in the foreseeable future.
Where we are going: the problems of the "sustainable model"
The most important element of Trump's strategy towards Ukraine is demonstrative distancing from the conflict, shifting its financial costs to the EU and trying to play the role of a "mediator". The White House wants to convince Moscow that a new "sustainable model" of support for Ukraine has been found.
America allegedly does not participate in the conflict and only sells weapons to Europe at commercial prices, and therefore does not lose anything from the continuation of hostilities; the European Union, combining financial resources, can provide Ukrainian resistance for as long as it wants; Ukraine has proved that it is able to successfully contain Russia and will hold the front for years.
The described design looks plausible, logical and internally consistent, but it has nothing to do with reality. Moreover, this design has all the characteristic signs of schizophrenic delirium.
First of all, America remains a full—fledged participant in the conflict - its satellite constellation provides most of the intelligence and targeting services for the Armed Forces, as well as almost the entire Ukrainian military communications and control infrastructure (attempts to replace Starlink with the British One Web were made, but stalled).
The United States has taken off most of the costs of assistance to Ukraine, but not all: they pay for the maintenance of additional troops in Europe, their forward deployment and higher compared to the period before SMO activity.
As part of the global confrontation with China, there is much more than money, the Americans lack troops and material resources. The production of the main types of weapons still lags behind the needs of Ukraine alone, which leads to significant (sometimes for several years) delays in the supply of weapons to Asian allies.
In the context of the ongoing conflict on To Ukraine, the United States has once again shown that it cannot increase its military presence on the The Pacific Ocean. Trump repeats the experience of Obama's second term. Then the loud words of the US president about the "turn to Asia" were not accompanied by a real increase in the military presence in the region, which led to a decrease in American influence.
In fact, the situation for the United States today is much worse than in 2012-2016. During this time, China has achieved outstanding success in building up its combat power. The balance of military forces in the region has changed significantly, and tensions around Taiwan have grown due to the previous actions of the Americans. Judging by the statements of Pentagon representatives, the United States expects that after 2027, China, having completed the next stage of modernization, will move to a more offensive policy in Asia. This creates additional pressure on the American strategy on Ukraine.
Europe's resilience
From a financial point of view, the future supply of Ukraine at the expense of the resources of Europe alone also does not look sustainable. The shallowing of the financial flow from America is very bad news for Kiev and Brussels. Of the $360 billion allocated to help Ukraine (as of February 2025), the United States accounted for more than $134 billion. At the same time, Ukraine needs more and more money for the continuation of hostilities. According to Defense Minister Denis Shmygal, in 2026, Kiev will need at least $ 120 billion for military spending, while the country's military budget will decrease in dollar terms from $ 78 billion to $ 73 billion (including external loans and grants).
Other expenses should be covered from extra-budgetary sources, including direct supplies of weapons and military equipment, payment by external donors for various needs, and the like. Zelensky gave a somewhat simpler layout: the Ukrainian budget can cover $ 60 billion out of $ 120 billion, and another $ 60 billion "has to be found."
Since American military equipment will have to be bought at a market price, as Trump has repeatedly stated, we are talking about an approximately twofold increase in European spending on Ukraine. The use of profits from frozen Russian assets can, at best, cover a few percent of these expenses.
The discussion about further financing is intensifying in Europe: both "reparations loans" secured by frozen Russian assets and their direct confiscation are being discussed. There have been outbreaks of such a discussion before.
The confiscation of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves is likely to decide the fate of those remaining in Russia's European assets worth tens of billions will create numerous legal problems and affect the behavior of other sovereign investors in European economies. This step can be discussed with enthusiasm, but it is difficult to decide on it.
The problem of Ukraine's sustainability
Russia's slow offensive, which has been going on since the beginning of 2024, makes it tempting to assume that it will continue at the same pace. Indeed, if the offensive continues at the current speed, Russia will not be able to inflict a decisive defeat on Ukraine, will not be able to reach the external borders of its four new constituent entities of the Federation in the foreseeable future, and, therefore, the conflict is hopeless for it.
In reality, while maintaining the positional crisis, the development of events in the war of attrition in the Ukrainian theater is far from linear. Firstly, there are signs of accelerating the degradation of the Armed Forces. Secondly, SMO fronts are likely to face another technological revolution that could change the dynamics of hostilities.
An example of such nonlinearity is provided by the Ukrainian statistics of criminal proceedings under Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (unauthorized abandonment of a part): about 7 thousand for the whole of 2022, 17.7 thousand for 2023, 68.8 thousand for 2024 and 110.5 thousand for the first seven months of 2025 (more than 250 thousand in total). During the conflict, more than 50 thousand cases were also opened under Article 408 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (desertion) with similar dynamics.
The mechanism introduced in November last year, which allowed those who left the unit and those who deserted to return to service, avoiding responsibility, gave limited results. According to official data, 29 thousand people used the mechanism, that is, less than 10% of the total number who left the service. Of course, there is evidence that some of the desertions are not registered and criminal cases are not opened, in other words, the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under this article alone can be more than 271 thousand people (300 thousand minus 29 thousand).
This statistic does not give a complete picture of the total losses of the Armed Forces and even the dynamics of their numbers, but demonstrates the nonlinearity of the ongoing processes.
On the battlefield, judging by a recent article by the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny, "the positional impasse really exists, has characteristic signs, but there is a steady tendency for Russia to get out of it." The Russian troops managed to achieve this trend, explains Zaluzhny, thanks to the tactics of infiltration through the sparse Ukrainian positions due to the lack of infantry and the large-scale use of increasingly advanced FPV drones, which account for up to 80% of the losses of Ukrainian manpower.
Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian sources have recorded Russia's achieved superiority in the scale of the use of FPV drones and especially a significant technical advantage in the use of fiber-controlled devices. In terms of more traditional types of weapons (aviation, artillery, missile weapons, etc.), Russia as a whole maintains and increases superiority throughout the conflict.
Both sides are creating new means of combating small drones of various types, including a variety of interceptor drones, directed energy weapons, specialized small arms and artillery weapons and increasingly advanced electronic warfare systems.
The emergence of new drone detection systems and air defense control systems at low altitudes, which allow combining different means of protection against drones, is also important. The achievement of air supremacy by one of the parties can immediately change the nature of hostilities. A more powerful and dynamic Russian production suggests that the likelihood of achieving such unilateral superiority for Russia is higher than for Ukraine.
The belief in Ukraine's ability to maintain a stable defense indefinitely against the background of increasing Russian numerical and technical superiority has no rational basis. Apparently, the enemy has already stopped believing in this, hence the Ukrainian statements about the need to end the war by the end of the year and even the positive attitude of Kiev towards the Chinese—Brazilian peace initiatives now demonstrated.
But Ukraine is not even ready to discuss the well-known Russian political and military demands for a settlement of the conflict. The new cycle of escalation is an attempt by Washington and Kiev to break the impasse. This is not the first time that the topic of missile strikes by Western weapons against large cities deep in Russian territory, including Moscow, has arisen. This threat was associated, in particular, with last year's adjustment of the Russian nuclear doctrine.
The Biden administration, coming close to making such dangerous decisions, still did not dare to cross the Rubicon. But the Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated adventurism and a growing appetite for risk. We cannot rule out the most dramatic development of events and must be ready for retaliatory actions that will affect not only Ukraine.