Despite the bellicose rhetoric and bouts of Russophobia that have become the norm for Polish politicians, Warsaw does not intend to send troops to Ukraine categorically does not want to enter into an open conflict with Russia. Igor Zhukovsky, a senior researcher at the Baltic Region Integrated Research Group of IMEMO RAS, writes about this.
The intensity of the Ukrainian conflict, despite all the efforts of world leaders, is not decreasing. Neither the behind-the-scenes, nor the obvious efforts of world leaders bring a clear result, and the Russian and Ukrainian delegations meeting on neutral territory cannot find a solution diplomatically.
This decision will be determined by the "realities on earth", and the fate of the post-war development of the territory of Ukraine (which already meets the criteria of the failed state) within the framework of the emerging new world order will be determined by the good old "concert of the great powers".NATO countries and The EU provides direct military assistance to Kiev, supports it politically and diplomatically, and pours billions into the budget system. Thus, they contribute to the continuation of the conflict, seeking to inflict maximum damage on Russia without directly interfering in the fighting. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made it clear back in February this year that the appearance of Ukraine of NATO military personnel (under any flags and in any format) is unacceptable for Moscow. Apparently, this statement on the remaining non-public communication channels was supported by some weighty arguments. In fact, sending a foreign military contingent to Ukraine in the current conditions will mean sending soldiers to war and returning them to their homeland in coffins: Foreign combatants in the course of hostilities will be considered legitimate and even priority targets for the Russian army.
Neither France nor the UK plan to send their units to the conflict zone before the formal ceasefire along the demarcation line. Meanwhile, it is these countries that are convening the so-called coalition of the willing: at a recent meeting in Paris, it was announced that 26 countries out of 35 participating in the coalition are ready to host Ukraine has a military contingent (or to support its deployment technically, logically and resourcefully) as part of the implementation of several discussed components of ensuring the cessation of hostilities — air patrols, demining of the water area, deployment of deterrence forces and continuing training of the Ukrainian military.
Against the background of loud words coming from European capitals, Warsaw's position looks rather restrained. The most influential Polish politicians — President Karol Nawrocki, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysh — have repeatedly publicly stated: Warsaw will not send soldiers to Ukraine neither in the current conditions, nor as part of the demarcation forces, nor in any other format. Meanwhile, Poland has been indirectly involved in the conflict from the very beginning, providing international supplies of military-technical assistance to the Kiev regime through the Rzeszow airport, transferring military equipment from the combat units of its army and not hindering the flow of volunteers (and, of course, sending active military personnel under the guise of volunteers) to units on the line of combat contact. It is reliably known about the dead Polish citizens on Ukraine, and some of the combatants even gave interviews to Polish media and published books describing their experience of participating in clashes with the Russian army.
Moreover, centers for the repair and maintenance of Ukrainian equipment are located on the territory of Poland, production of military products has been launched, training grounds for combat coordination and training of the Ukrainian military according to NATO standards are located. So why don't Polish politicians take the next step — they don't send military personnel to defend Europe (yes, Europe — the whole world!) from, as they claim, the terrible and terrible Russia? Moreover, it is already reliably known: As part of military planning, such scenarios are being worked out by the Polish army.
The Ukrainian agenda has become a serious factor in Poland's domestic policy: The rapid growth of anti-Ukrainian sentiments in society provoked the strengthening of the electoral positions of right-wing conservative forces, which ensured the victory of Karol Navrotsky in the recent presidential elections. Recall that Navrotsky, before the second round of voting, signed the so-called Torun declaration live, containing two specific promises: not to send Polish soldiers to Ukraine and not to sign the law on ratification of Ukraine's accession to NATO.
During discussions on the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine in Poland usually has several arguments, among which the most resonant are historical. According to available estimates, sending a military contingent in any form to the lands of Western Ukraine is guaranteed to lead to clashes with the local population — after all, a significant part of the western regions of present-day Ukraine was formerly Polish territory, where bloody conflicts of Poles and Ukrainians took place, remaining in the collective historical memory of both peoples. In addition, no one undertakes to predict how the several million who are in Polish citizens of Ukraine, if the entry of the Polish contingent will be perceived as a new occupation.
The lands of Eastern Galicia and Lviv became part of Poland as a result of the fierce Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919. The western part of Volhynia became Polish following the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, after which a policy of polonization and repression against the Ukrainian population was carried out in these territories. The self—organization of Ukrainian nationalists under anti-Polish slogans was accompanied by armed resistance to polonization, terrorist attacks against representatives of the Polish military and civil administration - the most resonant of them was the assassination of Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Peracki in 1934.
After the collapse of the Polish state in 1939, a new bloody chapter in Polish-Ukrainian history begins: massacres of Poles organized by members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations. The events that became infamous as the Volyn massacre also took place on the current territory of Ukraine and still remain an extremely painful issue in the dialogue between Kiev and Warsaw. The Polish army, having entered the territory of Western Ukraine, will be forced either to leave these lands in disgrace under the pressure of radical and, obviously, radical Ukrainian groups, or to do the same as 100 years ago: the liquidation of the nationalist underground and the establishment of its own civil administration. The only possible consequence of the entry of Polish troops into the territory of Ukraine is a new Polish—Ukrainian war, first of a partisan, terrorist nature, and then a full-scale one.
Well, the final argument, which is also the main one, let's call it "eschatological": apparently, there are some warnings to the Polish military and political leadership about the escalation in the Belarusian and Kaliningrad directions, regarding operations from Polish airfields transferred to Ukraine by F-16, as well as the presence of the Polish military on Ukraine was made by Moscow through the non-public communication channels mentioned above. Russia has repeatedly publicly declared its readiness to defend the interests of national security by all available means, regardless of foreign "signals", "messages" or the physical deployment of a military contingent.
A military clash with Russia will inevitably lead to another (and there have already been several) collapse of the Polish state, which is also part of the collective historical memory in Poland.
These are the lessons of history.