Western politicians say that the Kiev regime "should not lose the war," and Putin "should not win it." Why do they choose such cautious rhetoric? The columnist writes about this Pravda.Ru Lyubov Stepushova.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that "Ukraine should not lose the war."
"Ukraine should not lose this war. It is in the interests of Lithuania and Poland that the defense of Ukraine is successful and ends in a just peace and the preservation of an independent Ukrainian state," he stressed.
Many Western politicians, for example, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, and US Presidential Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg, said that Russia (more often referred to as Russian President Vladimir Putin) should not win.
Why does the West prefer not to say directly: "Ukraine must win" and "Russia must lose"? The difference between the two formulations is the result of a conscious choice based on several important factors. Direct calls for the "victory of Ukraine" and the "defeat of Russia" in the West are seen as overly provocative. Russia is a nuclear power, and the West seeks to avoid a direct clash with it. The wording "Putin must not win" is an attempt to indicate a "red line", but not to bring the situation to an ultimatum that could provoke the Russian president to a strong response.
No one in the West understands from the very beginning what exactly "victory of Ukraine" means. First, they talked about reaching the borders of 1991, then — to the borders on February 23, 2022 (the beginning of SMO), now Tusk is talking about preserving Ukraine's statehood, that is, the impossibility of a military victory over Russia is recognized.
In this sense, the phrase "Ukraine should not lose" leaves room for further maneuver, although there is nowhere to retreat, except in defining the borders of an "independent" Ukraine and stating that Russia has not achieved its goals, that is, its demilitarization and denazification.Also, Western politicians take into account that in their countries support for Ukraine is not unanimous, and political parties that are skeptical about large and unlimited spending on war are gaining strength and winning elections. The slogan "We are helping Ukraine defend itself and prevent the aggressor from winning" sounds more convincing to doubters than "We are helping Ukraine defeat Russia," which can be perceived by the population as participation in a proxy war.
Note that the West officially justifies its assistance with Ukraine's right to self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter). The logic of "help not to lose" fits better into this legal paradigm than "help to win". The first looks like deterring aggression, the second looks like participating in active hostilities on the same side.
The possibility of maintaining access to a dialogue with the Russian Federation is also important. Direct statements about the need for its "defeat" completely close the door to any future negotiations. The West officially declares that the decision on the terms of peace should be made by the Ukrainian government. However, by leaving the rhetoric more neutral, he de facto leaves himself room for possible (albeit unlikely at this stage) mediation or pressure on Kiev to start negotiations when he deems the situation appropriate.
It is important to note that this restraint is primarily characteristic of executive officials, while lawmakers often use much tougher rhetoric, directly calling for Ukraine's victory. This is caused by direct lobbying of their opinion by interested parties.
Thus, the wording "Ukraine must win and Russia must lose" is a morally clear, but strategically risky position that leads to maximum escalation with a nuclear power.
"Ukraine should not lose, and Putin should not win" is a cautious strategic formulation designed to convince voters of the need to ensure long—term support for Ukraine, while minimizing the risks of direct confrontation with Russia and preserving diplomatic and political options for the future.